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CASE COMMENTARY
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN A MARITIME
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASE: Lewis v. Timco, Inc.
David R. Owen* and J. Marks Moore, III**
The March 1983 issue of the Louisiana Law Review contained an
article by the authors entitled "Comparative Negligence in Maritime
Personal Injury Cases."' The article expressed the opinion that the
admiralty rule of comparative negligence is applicable in a maritime
products liability case,2 citing several authorities for this statement.
Indeed the authors were not aware of any admiralty case reaching
a different result. On February 14, 1983, however, shortly after that
issue was set in type, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that comparative negligence was not applicable in
a maritime products liability case. Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 697 F.2d 1252
(5th Cir. 1983), rehearing en banc granted, No. 81-3022 (Apr. 18, 1983)
(en banc rehearing June 7, 1983). The authors respectfully suggest that
the case was wrongly decided.3
The plaintiff, Alfred Lewis, was injured while working on a jackup
drilling barge in the coastal waters of Louisiana. He was operating
a power tong device in an attempt to retrieve a piece of equipment
that had been accidently dropped into the drilling hole. The device
had been manufactured by defendant Joy Manufacturing Company and
was owned by defendant Rebel Rentals, Inc. A representative of defen-
dant Edwards Rental and Fishing Tools, Inc. was in direct charge
of the "fishing" operation in which plaintiff was participating at the
time of his accident. Lewis also sued his employer, Timco, Inc., but
that defendant was dismissed because Lewis' exclusive remedy against
his employer was under the Longshoremen's Act.'
The power tong unit had a design defect that could create a situa-
tion in which the "snubbing line" could wrap around the operator if
the operator did not manipulate the controls in precisely the right
sequence. Joy's instruction manual gave no warning of this severe
hazard, but it was well known to the representatives of Rebel and
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. 43 LA. L. REV. 941 (1983).
2. Id. at 947-49.
3. The editors of the Review have graciously afforded the authors the opportuni-
ty to supplement their earlier article by commenting in some detail on the Lewis
decision.
4. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. SS 901-950
(1976).
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Edwards who were thoroughly experienced in this operation. For
Lewis, on the other hand, this job was only his second full-time assign-
ment as a power tong operator. Although he was having obvious prob-
lems in synchronizing the controls, the Rebel and Edwards represen-
tatives did not advise him to shorten the snubbing line, an action which
would have prevented the injury.
After a bench trial, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana found Joy liable both in strict products
liability and in negligence and found Rebel and Edwards each liable
in negligence. The court assessed financial responsibility among them
on a 40/o-40/o-20%/o basis. It also found Lewis 500/o contributorily
negligent for failing to adjust the length of the snubbing line. The
District Court therefore entered judgment for only one-half of plain-
tiffs damages. Lewis appealed on the ground that the doctrine of com-
parative negligence has no place in strict liability cases. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and reversed.'
The authors maintain that the admiralty rule of comparative
negligence is applicable in a maritime strict liability case such as Lewis.
They further submit, with all due respect, that neither the reasoning
nor the authorities cited by the Court of Appeals supports its
conclusion.
The issue of comparative negligence in strict liability cases has
been much discussed by courts and commentators. Those who believe
that the damages suffered by a plaintiff in a strict products liability
case should not be reduced to the extent of his negligence have
generally argued that negligence cannot be compared with no-fault.
Such analogy, they contend, would be like comparing "apples and
oranges," trying to fit "square pegs in round holes," or attempting
to "mix oil and water." This purported analysis is little more than
a play on words, and the Lewis court engages in just such an exercise.'
These opponents of comparative negligence in strict liability cases,
including this panel of the Fifth Circuit, also argue that public policy
demands that the burden of injuries caused by defective products
should be treated as a cost of production and spread among all con-
sumers of the product. It is readily apparent that this analysis is in-
complete; public policy certainly does not require that consumers
generally should contribute to the social cost incident to the negligence
of individual consumer-plaintiffs.
Most courts and most commentators have favored the application
of comparative negligence principles in strict liability cases.' Although
5. The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Garza, Politz, and Williams with Judge
Politz writing for the court.
6. 697 F.2d at 1255 n.7.
7. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 740-41, 575 P.2d 1162, 1171,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 389 (1978), and authorities cited therein; see also Note, Contributing
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no purpose would be served by citing all the cases and articles
reaching this conclusion, no commentary on this subject would be com-
plete without two references. Professor Schwartz in his treatise on
comparative negligence summarizes the issue and expresses the opin-
ion that comparative negligence is quite compatible with strict
liability.8 The Lewis court fails to cite this leading text or any court
decisions opposed to the Schwartz thesis.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of California in Daly v. General
Motors Corp.,9 after fully discussing all of the arguments both for and
against, held that comparative negligence is applicable in a strict lia-
bility case. This decision takes on added authority because that court
originated the strict liability doctrine ' ° and was a leader in judicial
adoption of pure comparative negligence." The court recognized "the
theoretical and semantic distinctions between the twin principles of
strict products liability and traditional negligence, [but maintained that]
they can be blended or accommodated." 2 In fact it referred to the
"apples and oranges" argument as "conceptually suspect."13 Eschew-
ing "the simple expedient of matching linguistic labels," the court
discussed in detail the policy considerations briefly, but inaccurately,
mentioned by the Lewis court and found no "foundational reasons"
for holding that the doctrine of strict products liability would be
"defeated or diluted by adoption of comparative principles. 14 In addi-
tion, the California court felt "strengthened in the foregoing conclu-
sion by the federal experience under the maritime doctrine of
Iunseaworthiness,' "15 noting the close similarity between unseawor-
thiness and strict products liability.
The authors of this commentary similarly felt strengthened in their
previous treatment of the subject by three decisions of the United
States Supreme Court applying comparative negligence in unseawor-
thiness cases. 6 The Lewis court cites, without comment, only one of
the Supreme Court decisions" and then reaches the opposite result.
Negligence-When Should it be a Defense in a Strict Liability Action?, 43 LA. L. REV.
801 (1983).
8. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 195-209 (1974 & Supp. 1981).
9. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (4-3 decision).
10. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).
11. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
12. 20 Cal. 3d at 734, 575 P.2d at 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
13. 20 Cal. 3d at 735, 575 P.2d at 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
14. 20 Cal. 3d at 736, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
15. 20 Cal. 3d at 738, 575 P.2d at 1170, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
16. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 1954 A.M.C. 1 (1953); Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 1939 A.M.C. 1 (1939); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S.
110, 1936 A.M.C. 627 (1936). See Owen & Moore, Comparative Negligence in Maritime
Personal Injury Cases, 43 LA. L. REV.. 941, 948 & n.56 (1983).
17. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 1954 A.M.C. 1 (1953).
1983] 1545
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Since unseaworthiness is also "a species of liability without fault," 8
a United States Court of Appeals should have felt bound to follow
the Supreme Court decisions.
The Lewis court cites the decisions of three United States Courts
of Appeals and indicates that at least one implicitly declined to apply
comparative negligence in products liability cases in admiralty. The
court, however, recognizes that the Ninth Circuit, in Pan-Alaska
Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design Co., 9 explicitly and
fully held that comparative negligence applies in maritime products
liability and that the Sixth Circuit, in Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio
Navigation Co.,90 has so held without discussion on the basis of Pope
& Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn.21 The third decision cited is that of the Eighth
Circuit in Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp.' Although com-
parative negligence was not involved in that case of strict liability
in admiralty, the court in dictum indicated that the doctrine was ap-
plicable, citing the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)." This con-
clusion would necessarily be true because section 766 of DOHSA
specifically incorporates the doctrine of comparative negligence. In
short, in a strict liability case involving death on the high seas a
federal court is required under DOHSA to apply the comparative
negligence rule.
It is thus apparent that the Lewis court does not cite any deci-
sion supporting its conclusion but does in fact cite one Supreme Court
decision and three decisions of Courts of Appeals all of which reach
the opposite conclusion. Indeed there is an odd omission in that the
Fifth Circuit itself has previously approved a jury charge in a non-
maritime strict liability case requiring a reduction of damages in pro-
portion to the plaintiff's contributory negligence.24 The array of law
review articles cited in the opinion is equally puzzling. The articles
by Plant25 and Feinberg26 and the note in the Southern California Law
18. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94, 1946 A.M.C. 698, 704 (1946).
19. 565 F.2d 1129, 1978 A.M.C. 2315 (9th Cir. 1977).
20. 416 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1969).
21. 346 U.S. 406, 1954 A.M.C. 1 (1953).
22. 460 F.2d 631, 1974 A.M.C. 1341 (8th Cir. 1972).
23. 46 U.S.C. SS 761-768 (1976).
24. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975). See also
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 547 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1977), wherein the Fifth Circuit
certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether "simple negligence"
is, under Florida law, a comparative defense to a strict liability action. The Florida
court replied that it was, and the Fifth Circuit referred to that finding as "sensible."
Id. at 887.
25. Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 40 LA. L. REV. 403
(1980).
26. Feinberg, The Applicability of a Comparative Negligence Defense in a Strict
Products Liability Suit Based on Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2D (Can Oil
and Water Mix?), 42 INS. COUNS. J. 39 (1975).
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Review all reach the conclusion that a negligent plaintiff should not
recover full damages from a defendant in a products liability case.
The recommendation that comparative negligence should not apply
in strict liability cases, contained in the article by Robinson 8 and in
a comment,29 both in California law journals, preceded the decision
in Daly v. General Motors Corp. in which the California Supreme Court
rejected such views.
The Lewis court seeks to justify the recovery by the plaintiff of
his full damages on the basis that he was guilty of only "simple
negligence."3 No attempt is made to reconcile this label with the
district court's finding of fact, accepted on appeal, that Lewis was
50% at fault. On a quantitative basis, this finding of fault would seem
to be considerably more than "simple negligence." The authors,
however, would argue that plaintiff's negligence should reduce plain-
tiffs recovery even if the negligence is only 5%.
By dismissing the plaintiff's negligence as merely "simple," the
court is in effect recognizing the much-criticized jurisprudence of
degrees of negligence, a concept that fortunately has never found favor
in admiralty. The maritime law provides a flexible mechanism for
apportioning fault.' It originated in collision cases but recently has
been employed in a maritime products liability case.2 The procedure
is to evaluate a party's negligence separately as to the nature and
extent of his culpability and as to the causal connection thereof with
the casualty. These two preliminary judgments are then factored in-
to an overall percentage of contributing fault. For example, the
culpability of an inexperienced workman guilty of only "simple
negligence, ineptness or inadvertence" 3 would seem to be of a very
low order. However, Lewis's failure to properly adjust the snubbing
line was active negligence that led directly to his injury. If the court
of appeals disagreed with the finding of 50% negligence, its proper
options were to set aside the finding as clearly erroneous" and fix
a percentage of its own or, preferably, to remand the case to the
district court with instructions as to the proper rationale for appor-
tioning fault. 5
27. Note, Products Liability, Comparative Negligence, and the Allocation of Damages
Among Multiple Defendants, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 73 (1976).
28. Robinson, Square Pegs (Products Liability) in Round Holes (Comparative
Negligence), 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 16 (1977).
29. Comment, Comparative Fault and Strict Products Liability: Are They Compati-
ble?, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 501 (1978).
30. 697 F.2d at 1255.
3i. See Owen & Moore, supra note 16, at 956-58.
32. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1978
A.M.C. 2315 (9th Cir. 1977).
33. 697 F.2d at 1255.
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
35. Judge Gordon of the Eastern District of Louisiana has said: "In calculating
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What the Fifth Circuit has created in Lewis v. Timco, Inc. is a
form of absolute liability in strict products liability cases. It is both
practically and theoretically important to distinguish between absolute
liability and strict liability. As the Supreme Court of California noted
in the Daly case: "From its inception, however, strict liability has
never been, and is not now, absolute liability. 36 In Lewis, for example,
Timco, Inc. was absolutely liable to its employee Lewis under the
Longshoremen's Act. His negligence did not reduce his benefits under
the Act.37 Such absolute liability without bar or diminution by reason
of the plaintiff's negligence has been created by other than workers'
compensation statutes.38 Strict products liability, afloat as well as
on shore, bears no resemblance to such forms of absolute liability.
Rather, it is in the admiralty closely similar to liability for unseaworthi-
ness and should likewise involve the application of comparative negli-
gence principles.
the degree of fault, the court must consider, under basic common law tort principles,
the blameworthiness of each vessel and the extent to which the vessel contributed
to the accident." Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Tug Captain Vick, 443 F. Supp. 722,
732 n.1, 1979 A.M.C. 1404, 1417 n.1 (E.D. La. 1977).
36. 20 Cal. 3d at 733, 575 P.2d at 1166, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
37. See Owen & Moore, supra note 16, at 950.
38. See, e.g., Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948).
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